Macedonia's political crisis: Expert Analysis from my SEEU colleague: "Macedonia’s instability has huge implications for the Balkans"

My colleague at SEEU, the Vice Rector for International Affairs, Dr. Blerim Reka, published this article about the current political situation in Macedonia. (Below)  We had the opportunity to meet and to discuss when I first arrived (and this was published 31 January 2017).  The parliamentary elections were held in December, but, as the time of this writing, a new government had not yet been formed. Even though this article was published nearly a month ago, the points about this political crisis and its implications for the Balkans are still timely.

https://www.gisreportsonline.com/macedonias-instability-has-huge-implications-for-the-balkans,politics,2113,report.html

Macedonia’s instability has huge implications for the Balkans

31 January 2017

Expert

Professor Dr. Blerim Reka

Region:

Europe

Former Prime Minister Nicola Gruevski is at the center of a wiretapping scandal that ignited a political crisis in Macedonia now entering its third year (source: dpa)

• Macedonia is nowhere near solving its internal and external challenges
• NATO and European Union membership still look far off
• Without Western support, the country could turn toward Russia
• China is also making a play for economic influence in the country

Macedonia is becoming the Balkans’ biggest security dilemma. It held parliamentary elections in December, but the winning party has failed to form a government. The outcome of the ongoing political crisis could have a long-term impact on the region disproportionate to the country’s small size, because it might signal which way the Balkans will tilt in the future: toward the West or Russia (politically) and toward China or Turkey (economically). The country has many unresolved domestic and foreign challenges, including a dispute with Greece over its name, as well as ethnic conflict and a political crisis at home. Unless Macedonia resolves these problems, its aspirations to join the European Union and NATO could be in jeopardy, and the country could change its strategic orientation. 

 

 

Macedonia’s instability has huge implications for the Balkans (Geopolitical Intelligent Service, 31.01.2017)

By Prof. Dr. Blerim Reka

Former Prime Minister Nicola Gruevski is at the center of a wiretapping scandal that ignited a political crisis in Macedonia now entering its third year (source: dpa)

Macedonia is becoming the Balkans’ biggest security dilemma. It held parliamentary elections in December 2016, but the winning party has failed to form a government. The outcome of the ongoing political crisis could have a long-term impact on the region disproportionate to the country’s small size, because it might signal which way the Balkans will tilt in the future: toward the West or Russia (politically) and toward China or Turkey (economically).

The country has many unresolved domestic and foreign challenges, including a dispute with Greece over its name, as well as ethnic conflict and a political crisis at home. Unless Macedonia resolves these problems, its aspirations to join the European Union and NATO could be in jeopardy, and the country could change its strategic orientation. The unpredictability of global geopolitics this year – with Brexit playing out and uncertainty about a new president in the United States – will make the challenge even more difficult.

The elections in December went off peacefully, a development welcomed by the international community, including Russia. But big challenges lie ahead. The hardest part remains forming a stable government. After the December elections, Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov assigned this task to the winning party, the ruling conservative-nationalist VMRO-DPMNE, which won 51 out of the 120 seats in parliament.

Coalition negotiations

Cobbling together a cabinet was made nearly impossible by the demands of Macedonia’s Albanian parties, published in a platform that was endorsed by Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama. VMRO-DPMNE nearly came to an agreement to form a coalition with one of them, the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), a traditional ally of theirs. DUI won 10 seats in December, enough to give the coalition a majority. But like the other Albanian parties, DUI set conditions that proved too hard for its partner to swallow. These included making Albanian an official language and extending the mandate of the special prosecutor appointed to investigate the VMRO-DPMNE government in a wiretapping scandal. While VMRO-DPMNE seemed willing to accept the former, the latter was a non-starter.

Negotiations went right up to midnight on January 30, the deadline set by President Ivanov for forming a government. Finally, DUI rejected the offer from VMRO-DPME, which is now calling for new elections. However, the president is expected to give the second-place party, the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), which won 49 seats, a chance to form a government. A long negotiation process is expected.

Resolving ethnic conflicts between Macedonians and Albanians is the key to stabilizing the country

Bringing in one of the country’s Albanian parties will be key for forming a new government. Albanians make up about a quarter of Macedonia’s population. Resolving ethnic conflicts between Macedonians and Albanians is crucial for stabilizing the country, but the current political configuration makes this unlikely in the short term. Most likely, if the Albanians demands on language and budget allocations are not met, they will push for federalization. This will lead to more ethnic clashes and further destabilization.

Almost as disruptive is the political battle – now heightened by VMRO-DMPE’s calls for immediate new elections – between the two main Macedonian parties, which is now entering its third year. In February 2015, the leader of the opposition Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), Zoran Zaev, alleged that Prime Minister Gruevski was responsible for illegal wiretaps and covering up a murder. The ruling party responded by accusing the SDSM of being a pawn of billionaire investor George Soros and his Open Society Foundations. It announced a plan to “de-Sorosize” the country, saying that the Hungarian-American businessman is working to “destabilize and destroy” Macedonia.

 Speedy elections, slow justice

The EU-brokered Przino Agreement was meant to resolve the political crisis following the wiretapping scandal. However, the special prosecutor established by the deal was unable to bring a single criminal case to court. In its November 2016 annual report on Macedonia, the European Commission repeated its “conditional recommendation” to start accession talks, pending the implementation of political reforms, but warned for the first time of “state capture.”

The whole Przino deal depended on two processes that were supposed to take place in tandem. Politically, a caretaker government was to prepare and hold credible elections. Legally, the special prosecutor would investigate and resolve the wiretapping scandal.

Macedonia is a key link in the southern Balkans chain, but is economically weak and has disagreements with many of its neighbors (source: macpixxel for GIS)

As it happened, the elections were organized speedily but justice proved slow. This allowed the crisis to drag on for two years. It became increasingly clear that the fate of the special prosecutor’s investigations would be decided by whoever succeeded in forming the next government.

If VMRO-DPMNE continues to hold power, it is unlikely to extend the special prosecutor’s mandate. If SDSM manages to form a government, or if a grand coalition is formed between SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE, then the special prosecutor could continue its work.

A grand coalition would allow a transitional government to be formed that could stabilize the country. Such a technocratic government, during a two-year transition period, could overcome obstacles in the country’s path toward Euro-Atlanticism: ethnic reconciliation, political dialogue and the issue of the country’s name. The West would probably get behind such a solution, increasing the chances that such a grand coalition could be formed.

Eastern challenges

The other possibility presents a far more chaotic scenario: one party manages to form a government through a coalition that gives it a tiny majority. Its initiatives will likely be continuously blocked and contested by the opposition. The political crisis will probably continue, pulling the country away from Euro-Atlantic integration and closer to Russian allies in the region (including Serbia and the Republika Srpska region of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Pro-Russian groups’ increasing influence in places like Bulgaria and Moldova make this trajectory even more likely.

So far, Macedonia has maintained a careful balancing act, remaining steadfast in its Euro-Atlantic strategic orientation, but refusing to participate in the West’s sanctions against Moscow. Yet, as a key link in the Balkans’ southern chain, Macedonia can expect plenty of Russian interference. Macedonian volunteers have joined Russians, Serbians and Montenegrins in the “Balkan Cossack Army,” a pro-Russian paramilitary unit whose mission is to fight for “pan-Slavic liberty.” In early November 2016, near Macedonia’ s northern border, Russian, Serbian and Belarusian troops held the “Slavic Brotherhood” joint military exercises.

Macedonia could be faced with a new wave of migrants if the situation in Syria deteriorates

These came at almost the same time that NATO held military exercises in nearby Montenegro, another small Balkan state that has adopted a Western orientation and experienced Russian meddling. In mid-October, a plot to overthrow the Montenegrin government and assassinate Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic was uncovered. Among those arrested in Montenegro were former Serbian special police officers and soldiers who had fought for pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine. In Serbia, several Russian nationals suspected of being involved in the plot were arrested and deported. Media in the Balkans have speculated that pro-Russian elements are now preparing similar activities in Macedonia and Kosovo.

In Kosovo, tensions between the Albanians and pro-Russian Serbs are already high. In December, Serbs built a wall in the divided city of Mitrovica, while in January a Serbian train decked out in nationalist flags and slogans was stopped at the Kosovo border.

As if these problems were not enough, Macedonia could also be faced with a new wave of migrants if the situation in Syria deteriorates or if Turkey balks on its deal with the EU, opening the floodgates for the nearly 3 million refugees sheltered there to flock to Europe. Macedonia lies directly on the “Balkan route” to the EU and voices have been raised in Serbia about building a wall on the Macedonian border. Already fragile internally and under pressure from other external forces, Macedonia would face a huge humanitarian challenge, not to mention the security threat. While Macedonia does not figure prominently on the target list of terrorists from the Middle East, the country has joined coordinated security initiatives with Kosovo and Albania that did end in the arrest of suspected Daesh (also known as Islamic State) collaborators. Such security challenges should not be underestimated.

U.S. out, China in?

The importance of Macedonia’s political crisis can be seen in the international reaction. After meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel on November 28, Albanian Prime Minister Rama declared that Macedonia’s stability is “crucial” for the region. In his last visit to Europe as U.S. president, Barack Obama lobbied Greek President Prokopis Pavlopoulos to find a solution to the dispute with Macedonia over its name, so that progress could be made toward allowing the country to join NATO. However, the Greeks still see any solution that includes “Macedonia” in the country’s name as a non-starter.

Rhetoric from the new U.S. president, Donald Trump, suggests that Washington’s foreign policy focus will probably be on China and the Middle East, leaving the Balkans to the EU. However, the bloc already has plenty on its plate, including Brexit and imminent elections in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy. While the EU is absorbed with managing the fallout from these events, the Balkans could easily fall victim to Russian hybrid war tactics and Muslim religious extremism. Concerns have also been raised in the region by President Trump’s praise of Vladimir Putin and NATO’s decision to postpone its summit from January 2017 until the summer. If the U.S. were to disengage, it would be catastrophic for the Balkans.

In the short term, Macedonia will lose yet another year of possible Euro-Atlantic integration

Apart from the domestic and foreign political machinations engulfing Macedonia, a battle for economic influence is playing out as well. After two decades of dominance by Turkish commercial interests, China is becoming an increasingly strong player. For example, Beijing recently announced the launch of a new fund for Central and Eastern Europe that aims to raise as much as 50 billion euros. As part of its New Silk Road infrastructure project, China promised Macedonia 500 million euros.

Macedonia would be happy to attract Chinese investment. Its unemployment rate is well over 20 percent, while 14 percent of its population has emigrated over the past 25 years. Public debt has tripled since 2008 to 4.8 billion euros, or nearly 51 percent of gross domestic product. It is estimated that the country will need an additional 1.7 billion euros in outside financing within the next three years.

Scenarios

Having long been in dire political and economic straits, Macedonia cannot expect to see much improvement soon. In the short term, the country will suffer from wasted opportunities and lose yet another year of Euro-Atlantic integration. It will become steadily more isolated from the West, which could possibly lead to internal destabilization. The external challenges will remain, and there will be no progress toward EU or NATO membership.

In the medium term, the Euro-Atlantic oriented Albanian members of Macedonia’s population will chafe at this state of affairs. The country’s many conflicts with its neighbors – with Greece over its name, with Bulgaria over its ethnic minority and with Serbia over its Orthodox church – make it ripe for interference from global and regional powers. Russia will continue to oppose NATO enlargement in the Balkans, while both Daesh and al-Qaeda have announced their intention to “liberate” the region, home of Europe’s largest indigenous Muslim population.

In the long term, the lack of Western involvement in the country will create a vacuum easily filled by other powers – from the northeast and from the southeast. Either would be dangerous for the stability in the region and Europe as a whole.